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Area constituted the greatest assembly of Naval might the world

has ever seen or may ever see again-far greater than the strength
which the Japanese Navy could muster in that area. And yet, mark
you, there was no effective single command agency which could
weld all of our Naval Forces into a single fleet under a single com

mand; Admiral Nimitz did not have that authority, nor did Gen
eral MacArthur; and no higher echelon could or would step into

the breach. The details of the second battle of the Philippine Sea

will keep you, and the student generations to �ollow you, occupied
for decades to come. Obviously, there were many things done which
could have been done differently in the light of hindsight; obviously,
there were things left undone which could have been undertaken
to great advantage. But to me, in retrospect, the vital and important

thing is that, although not unified under a single authoritative
command, all of those separated commanders were thinking in
sufficiently like terms to construct a mosaic of tactical victories .fit
ting together ino a greater mural of strategic victory which effect

ively terminated Japanese sea power. There were gaps in commun
ications and gaps in mutual understandings among the commanders,
but the great principles of sea-power had been inculcated in all of
those commanders and were literally second nature to them, so
that even without auth�ritative coordinating command, they in
stinctively moved in directions which were basically sound. Some
critics have said that disaster was narrowly averted - we can not
conceed that: the "ifs" of the critics are too improbable if one un
derstands the profound basic indoctrination that actuated Admiral
Nimitz, Admiral Halsey, Admiral Kinkaia, Admiral Oldendorf, Ad

miral Lockwood, and all of those who derived
their own
tasks and
.
/.
contributed their own parts to the over;.all victory. The War College
played an important part in .that indoctrination-and the War
College must continue to exercise leadership in channelling Navy
thinking along indoctrinated lines which will meet tomorrow's
innovations and complexities.
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I have stressed certain mental attributes and emphasized
sound indoctrination, because without them the achievement of good

logistical planning is impossible.

Your reading will have highlighted the evolution of logistical
planning prior to World War II and during the war years, and you
are aware of the evolutionary gropings that characterized the per

iod immediately following the beginning of hostilties. I shall there
fore waste no time on the past, but will sketch a vignette of the
Washington Logistics Workshop as it is today in the year one of
unification.
Let me say first, that the title of my discussion today
Logistical Planning for War-is not merely academic; regardless
of the strivings of men of good will, powerful national pressures

are still being exerted in furtherance of national policies; nations

still seek and use coercive devices for imposing their national wills
upon others. Even the most hopeful .and altruistic person must •
,

realize that we are being pressured from witho-qt and within, by

unpeaceful methods, to bend our will to conform to other views;

this pressuring, so far, has not involved shooting or the overt use of
force, but we are sitting on a powder keg which could be ignited
by a careless spark. The recent Governmental and Congressional
Record of Action is prima-facie evidence that the nation recognizes
the danger of war and is. strengthening its defenses. Therefore, · I
say that the logistical planning which we are doing today is in every
sense logistical planning against the tragic contingency of war, ·
even while it is our earnest hope that diplomacy, firmness, and our
latent power may serve as deterrents to another holocaust.

The genesis of our security thinking and the sequence of

planning events are, although altered in the detail by unification,
essentially the sa,me as in former years: national objectives are
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